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OPTIMAL COORDINATION OF AGGREGATE STABILIZATION
POLICY AND PRICE CONTROLS: SOMLSIM(JLA'IION RESULTS
ttSURENmER K. GUPTA, I.AURIN('E I-I. MEYER, FRFI)RIcQ. RAINES, ANt)
TzYII-JONt; TARN*
it: this paper ne presenl a determinist iv, thscrete time macrodi',iannc model that allows for the introdutnon
of varrjng degrees of price control as well as traditional stabili:at,on poliet', and that specifies the furniation
and implications of price expectations ho:!, when price conrolsare on and when they arcofJ.We then
solve by numerical methods for the stahiliatioand price control policy vectors that tnu,iin:i:e a viol
function oi'er an eight period horizmt giving weight bat/i to departure ft-ott, policy goals tiiulto point' COStS.
Tlits simulation is tarried out for three alternative i'ersion.sf the inflation process and fur tns'
different sets of initial conditions. The 1/tree alternaiit'theories of the inflation process (introduced by
changing parameter values in the basic ttiode() mar he descrihet! as followsI I) The P!tillircLipsei' (PL)
''traditional'' Phillips curve approach which ignores the feed-hack of'price expectationson aettut! prices
(2) The Friedman P/ic/ps Mortenseit (FPM) approach whit It dt'oies the existence of a knig-ritti trade-of]
antI (3) The "eclectic'' E art proach which accepts the importance of priceexpectations hut permitsi
bug-run trade-off. The diflerent initial conditions refer to the economic environmentire contrive cit the
outset and to which pohcv must respond. The Iwo bask enrirontnents we consider are(al excess supply
to the output mark:'i plus inherited inflation generated by previous excess dentand and (h) inflation aecotn-
panied hr excess clematid in the conitnodii' market.
The organi:ation of i/ic papet' is as follows. In Section I. we present the basic ntodel. SectionII
defines the cost function and Secihoti Ill presents thit.' assumed parameter values.The host' simulations
it/tic/i indicate the dynamic perforutance of the economy in the absence of controls, the ('ptima/ policy
.sitnidaiions. and the i,'fere'nces we c/raw are prc'setited it: Set'tiott It'. The conuhiditig Sectucui discusses
sotne furtherusefular'eiiue,s of research suggested by the presetil study.
I. Dvaoi'ffOF THE MODEL
The basic model consists of a multiplier accelerator approach to income deter-
mination and a Phillips curve approach to price determination. This type of
approach to short-run dynamics can be found, for instance, in Laidler [4].
Demand for Output
Aggregate demand is the sum of consumption, investment, andgovernment
expenditures. The aggregate demand equation is
(I) = + ++ a(Y- )+ A +G5
where E5 = aggregate demand in period k. G= government expenditures in
period k. A = autonomous component of private demand. and= total output
* Paper presented at the Third NBER Stochastic Control Conference. Washington.tiC.. Mar 19.
1974. Dr. Gupta is a Systems Engineer' NCCorp. Dayton. DvMc.'er :o!
and Associate Professors respectivelyrithe Economics Department, and Dr. Tarn is Associate
Professor in the Systems Science and Mathematics Department. all of Washington Lniversiiy. St.
Louis. ihis research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grants GK-36531 and
GK-22905A #2.
Due to space !imitations we present a very condensed exposition of the model. For a more
detailed discussion, see [6].
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in period k, all in real terms and where P = pricelevel in period k, W is the
nominal value of cash balances plus government securities,andK is thereal value
of equities andtangibleassets.
Real consumption expenditures[representedbythe first twoterms in (II]
areseen to be a simple function of lagged income (equals output), awealth effect,
and an autonomous component. We include a wealth term in the consumption
function in order to provide a link between the price level and aggregate demand.
In a more complete model, the primary channel through which changes in the
price level affect aggregate demand is via their influence on financial markets
and the interest rate. Our model does not, however, include a financial sector.
Real gross investment (represented by the third term iii (I)) is determined by a
simple accelerator plus an autonomous component. These specifications are
admittedly simplistic. They ignore the role of permanent income on consumption
and financial considerations on investment. Moreover, in an environment of
excess supply, the accelerator mechanism may only be weakly operative, if at all.
Nevertheless, they capture to a first approximation the same sorts of determinants
that would be present in more refined specifications.
A. the autonomous component of private demand is initially set equal to
zero. Changes inAare used to generate the initial conditions for our policy runs.
Gk. government expenditures in period k is defined as
=G + Uki
whereis the "normal" value of government expenditures and u-is the devia-
tion from the normal level introduced for stabilization purposesi.e. u-is the
aggregate stabilization policy instrument in our model.
Supply of Output
The position adopted in this paper is that output supplied is responsive o
aggregate demand, though. in a dynamic context, not necessarily equal to demand.
Thus we specify
-.=g(E--).O<g< I.
subject to the restriction that
(3') for all l.
where Yis defined as potential output in period k.
The restriction Oflis self-explanatory. However, we postpone consideration
ofthe short-run determinants of potential output untilwe have examined price
dctcriiiaatia aid ilic iok of price controls in the model.
ThePrieLeiel : A ctualwulExpt'ted
ActualPrice Lere!
Changes in the price level, in the absence of pricecontrols, are determined by












JO.if m, < 0 (price controls ofiu
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1,ifmk (price controls on)
The most general form of the Phillips curve identifies three influenceson price
change: (I) excess demand in the outputmarket;2(2) price expectations: and (3)
the tendency of prices to creep upward even in thepresence of excess capacity
andthe absence of inflationary expectations, represented by the positiveconstant.
h0.
In our policy simulations we employ three alternative versions of the Phillips
curve: (I) the Phillips [9]Lipsey [5] "traditional" version in which h0 > 0 and
I= 0;(2)the natural rate or accelerationist(FPM)version suggested by Friedman
[2], Phelps [8], and Mortensen [7] in which h0=0 and f=1; and (3) an eclectic
(E) version in which h0>0 and 0 < f<1. Further, we assume it to be a character-
istic of all three models that final output prices are more responsive upward to
excess demand than they are downward to excess supply. Hence we have assumed
throughout that h1 takes on a larger value when EkY' > 0, ("). than when
Ek - Y < 0, (h's').
The variable Yk indicates the status of price-controls:on"(=1), or "oil"
('k = 0). Price controls are turned on or off by means of the value selected for mk.
If the program selects1k< 0,is set equal to zero and no price controlsre
applied in period k -I-i.If the program selects rn 1kis set equal to one.
activating controls. The actual inflation rate under controls is then given by either
equation (4a) or (4b). lithe actual inflation rate that would prevail under price
controls in k + Iis less than 111k' equation (4a) determines the inflation rate.
Otherwise, equation (4b) holds and F,1=
Expected price changes. The most common cx ante behavioral hypothesis
concerning expectations is that of simple adaptive expectations, which, with respect
to the rate of inflation, is given by equation (6a), where the weight of more remote
inflation experience becomes increasingly important asi. approaches zero.
2T 'csrc deo':iipffls'nt i3 I nut pill ra tIter
than actual outputThisibecause an existing gap betweenandYrilust be due to one or both of
I I) a failure of demand: (2) a planned transitory adlustillent lag. neither ofwhichshould put upward
pressure on prices. Conversely. ifE4exceeds Y. prices should tend to rise even if actual output has not
reached potential.
The use of thevariable is necessitated by the fact that the m variable cannot itself take on some
value which implies no controls. Thus. rn = 0 means a complete free7e. not the absence of controls.Notealsoin cofljUflcwith equation(4a), that, iff > 0. thelarger is i.. the faster
is thefeedbackof past inflationon currentinflation-





Equation (6a) holdsif there arc noprice controls thisperiod or last period and
(6b) holds if thereare pricecontrols this periodi.e.. if there are price controls
this period, theexpected inflation rateis assumed to be the maximum allowable
rate. Note thatsince the expectedrate of inflation entersconcurrently into the
determination of theactual inflation rate,it follows that price controls can influence
the actual inflationrate in k -I-1 even though Pk +< i.t., price controls can
operate indirectly onthe actual inflationrate via their influence on the expected
inflation rate.
There is one morepossibiiityfl0 controlsthis period, but controls last
period. Equation (6a)is not suitable inthis case because it assigns weight to the
price controlledinflation rate last period,oblivious to the fact that price controls
are no longeroperative. To handlethis case we define a "no-control" expected
inflation rate, given by equation(7). If controls are inoperative for two
consecutive periods P'1becomes identical withP+, asdefined by (6a). However
if controls were appliedlast period. (but not thisperiod) equation (7h) obtains.
According to (7b), theexpected
{
P j =andYk= 0
[(I - ))P" + ).'] ± (1 - P)k.otherwise
p
where
. J P1, if',k =0 and = 0
=
E
h0 + h1 - + jP .otherwise
k
inflation rate when controls areremoved is a weighted average of actual price
experience under controls and a"shadow" price expectations effect that reflects
the rates of inflation that would havebeen expected in the absence of controls.
This in turn depends on shadow inflation rateseries given by equation (8b).
To clarify the specification of(7b), assumethat p = I. In this case, the expected
inflation rate if price controls wereremoved would depend exclusively on the
"shadow" inflation rate variable given by (8b) andthe past history of that variable.
This assumes that economic agents implicitlycalculate a series of hypothetical
- _*_.._1 ontrols and icthese to compute an expected aLuaI Iat 'p" rICe '
rate next period if controls are removed. However,with p = I. any direct impact
of controls on expectations through its influence on the actualinflation rate would
be precluded. To avoid such a narrow interpretation, we set1 > p > 0. Thus.
the relative weight of actual experience under price controls variesinversely with p.
The assumptions embodied in this formulation, even for papproaching 1.0.
may still be overly optimistic about the ability of price controls tomoderate
inflation. One potentially important behavioral aspect that the modelomits is
256the attempt to "catch-up" after controls are removed. To introduce this feature
into our equation explaining the inflation rate, we could include an additional
term specifying the price rise associated with "catching-tip" as proportional to
thegap between the actual price level and the price level that would have prevailed
in the absence of controls.4
Potentia! Output
The level of potential output is given by





enc-1k -I'f pc --> o
The quantity V is the maximum feasible level of output in the PL version in which
=0 and is the maximum level of output that can be sustained without accelera-
ting inflation in the FPM and E versions in which I > 0. Succinctly put. the
FriedmanPheipsMortensen theory states that employees will tend to over-
estimate real wages during a period of accelerating inflation due to the lag in
expected inflation adjusting to actual inflation. This overestimate (an underestimate
would obtain in reverse circumstances) leads to a temporary outward shift in
labor supply curves and hence in potential supply, and to a transitory reduction
in unemployment rates as acceptance wages appear to be more readily met and
search times are reduced. Thus, potential output, Y', will depend on the gap
between actual and expected inflation. This effect is also included in the eclectic
version.
The specification of the potential output equation also takes account of the
potential decline in supply of output associated with the imposition of price
controls. If =0, the additional term drops out. If price controls are on,
1k-=1 and the supply effect is assumed to be proportional to the reduction in
the rate of inflation economic units attribute to the operation of price controls.
If r ,then economic units believe that price controls were inoperative
i.e.. the maximum allowable rate was higher than the rate expected for that
period. In this case, price controls do not affect the supply of output. On the other
hand, if Pr> rn5 ,economic units find that price controls are biting with the
result that the potential supply of output will decline. If there is excess supply of
output. then output is not likely to be affected. If there is excess demand, on the
other hand, a decline in potential output will carry actual output lower also.
This specification, therefore, restricts the impact on the supply of output to
situations in which there is no excess supply in the output market.
The deciine in potenhiai output could also be made to depend on ihc
cuniukitive application of controlsfor instance, on the difference between the
actual price level and the price level that would have been expected to prevail in
the absence of controls.
We are indebted to the referee fordrawing our attention to the possibility of acatch-up effect.





AchlitiOfl°1 RestriCtiOflSon the UseofFii(t' ('ontrO!S
We impose tworestrictions onthe use of price controls.First, price cort
are onlyintroduced if theywill actuallylimit the inflation rate: i.e.,
I rots
(11)
Secondly, pricecontrols are notimposed if priceswould he lalling in the absence
of controls: If
(12)h0-j-h1T_i'_!-+f{p[(l -- -t- ].1- (I -1)1k- }0
then Yk-I =
II. 'FiiE Cosi FUNCTIONAL
In order to explorethe optimal coordinationof the two policy instruments,
we define a costfunctional to beminimized as given in equation (13).
(Y_ y \2
(4Pk
- ':)x100) q1(k) ----=- x 100)+
Y -i1
k=1L t
-21k3 oo±-{r, + r3(k - I) + r14---
+ r4[4(P' -fl XIOO]2]
where N is the time horizonfor the optimal policy.
(k)









where the initial conditions for the policy :nstrumcnts arc u2= u= = 0.
Costs are imposed for deviating from targetvalues of output and inflation
and for the use of policy instruments. The target valueof output is V. the maximum
feasible output in the PL model. Although output canexceed V in the FPM and
F models where 1 > 0, we assume Vis the target value of output inall three models
because it is the maximum feasible level of output that can beachieved without
imposing accelerating inflation rates necessary to sustain unanticipatedinflation
in our model We impose a highe! cost if output ts below Y(than if output
exceeds Y (q').
The target inflation rate is assumed to be zero. Costs arc thereforeimposed
for any departure from price stability.
The last two terms represent the costs associated with the use of the instru-
ments. The parameter r1 reflects the costs associated with changing thelevel of
our aggregative stabilization instrument. The difficulties, delays, andpotential
--I
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(13)J=wastes in the implementations of tax and expenditure changes for stabilization
purposes are well recognized. Our specification allows for three components of
the cost of price controls. Thus r2 represents the fixed cost associated with the
existence of price controls, r3 represents the incremental costs associated with
changes in price controls, and r4 represents a variable cost associated with the
use of controls. The "use" cost of price controls is assumed to vary with the
amount of inflation the controls prevent as a measure of the extent to which
controls interfere with private decision making and introduce distortions into
the allocation of resources.
Ill. THE VALUE OF THE PARAMETERS
The complexity of the model precludes the derivation of analytical results.
We have therefore selected values for the various parameters in the model and
explored the properties of the models through a series of simulation experiments.
It is convenient to divide the model parameters into three categories: behavioral
parameters, exogenous variables, and cost parameters. The vah'es of these model
parameters are presented in Tables Ia, lb. 2 and 3.
TABLE Ia
BEHAVIORAL PARAMETERS WITH TIlE SAME VAI.UE IN ALL MODELS
a w g h h A fi p
1.00.70.050.5.074.0370.20.50.9
TABLE lb
BFH.AvIoL PARAMETERS WITH DIFFER-
ENT VALUF.S
h0f c
PL 0.0074 0 0
FPM 0 1.0 0.25
E 0.0074 0.5 0.25
TABLE 2
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
W K A G
IABLF 3
CosT PARAMETERS
q q1 q2 r1 r2 r3 r4
0.1 1.0 1.0 0.025 7.0 2.0 0.8
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200 30,000 1,700 0A. Initial Conditions
We begin bycontriving an inflationaryenvironment accompanied by either
excess supply orexcess demand foroutput by altering the autonomous component
in the aggregatedemand equation. Initially, we setY = V = 1,000 and P100
To generate initialconditions, which are identicalfor all three models, we specify
a single setof parameter values.5
Excess supply andinflationTo impose both inflation and excess supply
on the model, weintroduce a +35 disturbancein period 1, maintain this value
through period 5, thenreduce A by 60 and maintain this lower value throughout
the base and policysimulations. By period 16 this generates an inflation rate of
about 9 percent (atannual rate) and an output level 8.3 percent below V (and
declining). This is theeconomic environment at the start of the stabilization
horizon in the excess supply case.
Excess demand and inflationToimpose inflation and excess demand
for output, we introduce a +25disturbance in the aggregate demand equation in
period 1 and maintain this valuethroughout the base and policy simulations.
This generates an inflation rate of aboutI 5 percent by period 17, with output at r.
B. Base Simulations
Next we determine how the system wouldbehave for the three alternative
versions of the inflation process if we kept policy instruments at their initial values
(Gk= 6 andYk= 0). The results ofthese "no policy" or base simulations are
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In particular, we set h00.0074, 0 = 0.5 and f = 1.0 for the excess supply run and we set
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KEYro FIGURES
Type ofcurves Quantity they represent
- - - - - No-policy trajectories
No-policy responses of potential output
--.- Optimal respons under the corresponding optimal policy (policies)
Optimal responses of potential output
Guidelines for the maximum price change allowed
Period to period changes in output, additional government spending, and percent price changes
are in annual rates.
i,,,11values at the bottom of each figure represent the minimum value of the cost functional and
its components obtained for each simulation. The figures in brackets below each number represent the
corresponding values when no policy is used for the given initial conditions.
(I) Excess supply and inflation (SI}In the SI case the output trajectories
are much the same but price behavior is quite different for the three models.
Output begins at 918 and declines gently over the period, reaching about 905
by the end of the simulation horizon. The difference in price behavior reflects the
powerful influence of price expectations on the inflation rate. The contrast between
the PL model where f = 0 and the FPM model where f = 1 is, of course, par-
ticularly sharp. In the PL model, the inflation rate (see Figure 5b) plummets from
its initial 9 to below 2 percent in the very first period; thereafter the inflation
rate remains almost constant. In the FPM model, on the other hand, the inflation
rate (see Figure 3b) declines from 9to only 7 percent in the first period, then
gradually declines over the next seven periods, reaching 6 percent by the eighth
period. The results using the E model more closely resembles the FPM than the
PL results. The inflation rate (see Figure Ib) declines from 9to 6 percent in
period one, declines gradually thereafter, reaching 5 percent by period eight.
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(2Jc'ess demandand w flat ion(DI)Similarly, in the 1)1 case the no policy
trajecwries differsignificantlY only withrespect to inflation. Although prices are
rising in all three cases,the rise is markedlygreater in the F PM and F models
compared to the FLmodel, again reflectingthe pronhiflant role of expectations
in the FPM andEViSjOflS.In the FL model,the inflation rate declines from its
initial I 5percent value to 4percent in the firstperiod and iemains at that level
throughout the next sevenperiods. Inherited inflation has noeffect on actual
inflation in this model ;therefore, the initialconditions with respect to the inflation
rate have noinfluence on theactual inflation rate. In the FPM model, where
inherited inflation plays apowerful role, the inflation rate dipsinitially from l5
to 13 percent.then rises gradually.The initial decline reflects the fact that the initial
inflation rate wasgenerated using a model that setho = 0.0074 as well as f = I
When the FPMmodel takes overItois set to zero and this results in an initial
decline in the inflation rate.The powerful influence of expectations takes over
and generates modestincreases in the inflation ratetheieafter. In the F model,
the inflation rate dropsfrom I 5 to 10 percent in thefirst quarter and then gradually
declines reaching 9 percentby the eighth period. Theinitial decline in this case
reflects the fact that thel5percent rate was generatedassumingI= 1.0: when
f was reset at 0.5the inflation rate immediatelydropped.
C. Optimal Policy Simulations
We ran two types of optimal policy runs. n one run wepermit the use of both
aggregate stabilization policy andprice controls while in the other we allow only
aggregate stabilization policy. Thebenefits of using price controls are better
judged by comparing these two policysimulations rather than comparing the
base simulations and the first policy simulation.
The model is highly nonlinear, involves numerous constraints, usesmultiple
controls and has a cost function which is not differentiable. As aresult, optimization
using analytical techniaues was not possible. A nongradient directsearch method
was therefore developed to permit optimizationby numerical method. The
algorithm is a modification of the Complex Method developed by Box [I]. It can
be shown that the algorithm will converge to a locally optimal control solution
under the assumption of a convex feasible set. While it cannot be proven that the
algorithm converges to the global optimum. the probability ol' such convergence
can be shown to increase with the number of initial points randomly chosen in the
solution space. Since computer costs increase with the number of points chosen.
this factor must be taken into account.0 Some experimentation revealed that the
algorithm converged to the same solution values given the same problem hut
different initial points. Moreover, the algorithm was successfully applied to a
variety of non-linear non-analytic test problems with known solution values.
Thus itis likely that the policy solutions we present are globally optimal.7
6 Following the recommendation ofBox. the number of initial p0mb (i(1'.Ct1 WaS 50 equal iO
ii +whereis the dimension of the solution space.
- See {3 for a full description of the algoriihni.
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kvccs SuppftInflation (SI)
I he trajectory followed by our aggregate siabihyation mstrumentis quite
similar ('or all three models, whether or1101price controls are a a i table. Government
expenditures arcimmediatelyincreascd by about S2() billion and further raised
to approximately S40 billion by time period 3, and thereafter tend to level ofl and
decline slightly. The strategy clearly is to eliminate excess supplyas quickly as is
feasibly possible, a choice made obvious by the fact that the reduction ofexcess
supply adds little to inflationary pressures (for the very reasons that the existence
of excess supply contributes little toward downward price flexibility). The success
of this policy is seen by the fact that in each case actual output has returned by
period 8 to within less than 1 percent of potential output (see Figs. l(a5(a)).
The real differences among the models involve the price control instrument.
Both the F and FPM models start out with a good deal of inherited expectationa!
inflationannual rates of' 6 percent and 7 percent respect iv clv (see for instance
Figs. 1(h), 3(b)). In both cases, maximum allowable price increases of less than
3 percent per annum arc imposed at the outset, and retaitu'd at that level for the
duration of the simulation. In the F version, price controlsare binding throughout.
while in the FPM variant, actual price changes are below the maximum allowable
until the last two time periods (Fig. 3(h)). This does not mean that price :ontrols
are redundant until period 7 of the FPM simulation. Quite the contrary: the
genius of price controls in the FPM framework is that by delimiting expected
inflation, price controls rapidly and powerfully reduce actual intlation, even below
permissible limits. In contrast, since there is no inherited inflation in the PL model.
there is little role for price controls to play, and their costs in fact determine that
they are never used! Thus Fig. 5 shows the optimal paths whether or not price
control is an admissible policy tool. Note in Fig. 5(b) that the optimu ;;;t;on
rate is allowed to creep upward fromless than 2 to more than 3 percent as excess
supply is eliminated :it is simply too expensive to try to control this magnitude
of inflation by either sacrificing output or imposing regulations.
The E and FPM simulations show rattler poor inflation records in the absence
of price controls, with annual inflation rates of 6 and 7 percent respectively, and
rising over time in both cases. The overall effect of allowing or prohibiting price
controls can be seen in Table 4 which shows the net reductions in total costs
TABLE 4
NETCosi Rri)IrIos
(percent. relatise to base run costs)
Stahili,ation StahiJzation
Policy Pius Price
Model Only Control Poluc)
Excess Supplyinflation (Si)









relative to the base runs.Note that in the SIsimulations, total costs are ieduce'J
by about halfunder each variant of themodel when both policy instruments are
available, whereas thereduction is only a quarter under the FPM variant, and a
third under the E variant,when only stabilization policy is used. Thus the efficiency
gains due to pricecontrols are 27 percent for FPM,14 percent for E. and 0percent
for the PL variant.
Excess DemandIflflat10hl(DI)
The aggregate stabilizationinstrument in the Dl environment is wised as
might be expected to promote asubstantial reduction in aggregate demand.
l'he cutback in governmentspending is much sharper in the E and FPM models.
starting at between minus$12 billion and minus $18 billion in the initial time
period compared to minus $4billion for the PL model, and is particularly steep
in the E and FPM runswithout price controls, rising to - $31 to - $34 billion in
the final effective timeperiod compared to a maximum of $24 billion when
price controls are available.The effect on output is typically small since most of
the reduction is in excessdemand.8 However, when price controls are not available,
the E and FPM versions showreduction from potential output of 2 and 3 percent
respectively.
The pattern of price control usage acrossmodels was similar in the Dl runs
to that of the SI runs. Pricecontrols of just under a 4 percent permissible annual
inflation were applied at the outset in boththe E and FPM models, and these
controls were neither varied nor suspended over theduration, while price controls
were never used in the PLversion. The underlying logic is similar to the SI cases.
Price controls prove an effective and relatively efficient means of dealing with the
expectational inflation that substantially augments the direct excess demand
inflation in the E and FPM models, whereas the absence of expectational inflation
in the PL model implies that stabilization policy is most efficient. However, the
results are far more extreme in the present instance. The performance of the
stabilization instrument alone with respect to inflation is pathetic in the E and
FPM models. The inflation rate hovers around 12 percent in the FPM model
while falling only to about 7 percent in the E version. This compares to about a
3 percent inflation rate in the PL model. Thus, the potential gains in the use of
price controls vary greatly across the models (base run costs for FPM were
14 times as great as those for PL), and these are reflected in the Dl tabulations of
Table 4. The gain in efficiency due to the use of price controls is 53 percent for the
FPM version and 43 percent for the E model, and again is zero for PL.
SUMMARY
The results ofa simulation study are usually critically dependent on the values
assumed for the parameters, and we have little reason to believe this will not he the
case here. Moreover, we are still at au early stage of the analysis and a number of
additional experiments that seem fruitful to us remain to be done. Some of these
S Theuse of price controls in the E and FPM versions results in a reduction in Y which effeiiel
constrains actual output during the initial time periods. Similar reductions in also occurred in the
SI simulations, but in those cases there was abundant excess supply.
2(are discussed in the concluding section of this paper. Nevertheless, even at this
juncture, certain conclusions seem sufficiently robust as to warrant emphasis here.
If expectations play a significant role in inllatioii theti price controls can
make an important contribution towards efficiently achieving macro-
economic goals,whether or notthe inflation is accompanied by excess
aggregate supply or demand.
Indeed, somewhat counter-intuitively, our results suggest a much larger
efficiency gain for price controls in the excess demand compared to the
excess supply situation.
Conversely, if there is no expectational element to the inflation, optimal
policy goals can be achieved without price controls.
The most favorable case for price controls is precisely a structure in which
there is no long run inflation-unemployment tradeoff. For it is here that
any inflation initiated by policy error or exogenous shock will stubbornly
persist unless the economy is willing to accept extremely toxic dosages of
contractionary fiscal-monetary policy.
Our simulation results provide little substantiation for the belief that the
use of price controls need only be sporadic and temporary. In our expecta-
tional inflation models, price controls were applied at the first opportunity
and retained for the duration of the run. It is not clear that a longer time
horizon would have made much difference. However, we may have loaded
the game against the temporary use of price control's by assuming in effect
that price controls will only dampen expectations after a prolonged
period of successful use. The introduction of the "catching-up" effect,
moreover, would be likely to accentuate the tendencies of the present
model with respect to price control usage; i.e. to reinforce a decision not
to use controls and to prolong the duration of controls once introduced
or possibly even to prevent their elimination. Note also that the inclusion
of the cumulative impact of controls on potential output would be
expected to increase the output loss associated with a given price control
regime, and hence would be expected to restrict the application of controls.
V FURTHER RESEARCH
As noted above, the results of a simulation study are typically sensitive to the
parameter values assumed. In the present study, we ran simulations with some
alternative values of h0, f, and. Onedirection for further study using this model
is to explore the sensitivity of the simulation results to alternative parameter
values. In particular, we plan to carry out simulations with alternative values of
the parameters that appear to be most critical to the effectiveness of controls:
e.g., p. )., and fi.
Another direction for future research concerns expansion and elaboration
of the basic model. We intend to respecify the inflation rate equation to incorporate
the "catching-up" phenomenon and the potential output equation to includethe
cumula(ive effect of controls on potential output. In addition, we plan to incorporate
a monetary sector and to connect the level of potential outputto the change in the
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capital stock as determinedby the investment equation.Introducing themonetar
sector will permit us tontrO(lUCe the (real) interest rate as a determinant of invest
ment, provide anadditional policy iiistrurncnt, andpermit us to capture withmute
precision the impact ofchanges in both the price level and the inflation rate on the
demand for output. Relatingchanges in the capital stock to potential output will
make the compositionof output as well as the levelof aggregate demand relevant
to the determinationof the inflation rate. Moreover, the aggregate supply Sector
could be further elaboratedby speci1ving labor supply and demand equations and
a wagedetermination equation. The advantageof so doing would he the ability
to differentiatebetween wage and pricecontrol programs and their separate
effects on the model.
Another possibility is tointroduce some exogenous component of inflation
into the Phillips curve equation torepresent sectoral influences such as the farm
and fuel price increases inthe recent inflation experience. Assuming that the
exogenous component ofinflation is not subject to control, we could determine
the implications of the modificationfor the optimal use of policy.
Finally, more work needs to be doneexploring alternative values for the
parameters of the cost function.In addition, we intend to rerun some simulations
with a modified cost function whichpenalizes only unanticipated inflation.
Washington Unirersiti'
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